[SCADASEC] NERC compliant equipment
wboyes at putman.net
wboyes at putman.net
Sat Aug 9 15:33:52 CDT 2008
Actually between 1 and 13, but yeah, that's it. Can I use your list? I
think it is a very clear explanation of the necessary steps.
I dunno where to start. I suggested creating some sort of pathway that
users, researchers and vendors could use to collaborate openly, and I don't
think you liked that idea.
Where would YOU start, and how would you do it?
Walt
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Walt Boyes
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"Matthew Franz"
<mdfranz at gmail.co
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Re: [SCADASEC] NERC compliant
08/09/2008 03:18 equipment
PM
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scadasec at news.inf
racritical.com
So we want to compress the number of days between 1 and 12 right?
Some of these are harder that other. Where do you start?
---
1) vuln found by someone (either inside/outside vendor, either
outside/inside legit user)
2) vuln reported to vendor
3) vuln confirmed by vendor
4) vendor identifies workarounds
5) vendor fix developed, code changes made identify workarounds until patch
6) fix enters vendor QA/regression
7) fix committed to release codebase
8) fix packaged for release, documentation completed
9) end user finds out about patch, vuln
10) user evaluates vuln/patch
11) patch/fix goes into user dev/QA systems
12) based on tresult, decision made whether to move patches to prod
12) patch goes to prod in selected environments
13) patch fully deployed throughout user org
>
> That's the problem. How do we adequately disclose vulnerabilities, help
> vendors correct them, help them and encourage them to provide timely
> patches, and get them to the end users and get them applied-- all without
> vastly increasing the vulnerability of installed systems to attack?
>
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